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I. Introduction
Chile should be the next country to be incorporated into the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) because of its
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impressive economic and democratic reforms. During the Summit
of the Americas, held in late 1994, President Clinton announced
that Chile. would be the next nation to be invited into NAFTA,
with all three current partners working towards Chilean accession.'
Chile should have been granted NAFTA membership soon after
the Summit of the Americas, but as of late 1997 nothing
substantial has yet occurred with regard to Chilean accession.2
Many in both the NAFTA member countries and in other Latin
American countries are puzzled at the delay, especially
considering that the United States has preached open trade and
political liberalization for decades to its Latin American neighbors.
Quite simply, it is the American political environment which is to
blame for the delay in Chilean accession, not the actual merits of
Chile's candidacy.
Some commentators believed that because of the "ordeal to
obtain congressional approval of NAFTA," the Clinton
administration was wary of repeating the process too soon,'
I See David E. Sanger, Chile is Admitted a North American Free Trade Partner,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1994, at A8; Helene Cooper & Jose de Cordoba, Chile is Invited
to Join NAFTA as U.S. Pledges Free Trade Zone for Americas, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12,
1994, at A3.
2 Clinton's latest in a series of unfulfilled promises came in early August 1997
during a White House News Conference where he pledged to renew his bid for fast track
negotiating authority. See Finlay Lewis, Clinton, Administration Open Fast-Track Push,
Copley News Service, Aug. 6, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Copnws File.
U.S. Trade Representative ("USTR") Charlene Barshefsky indicated that in early
September 1997, the White House would introduce fast track legislation geared to
produce a consensus in the Republican controlled Congress. See id. Success in an
agreement over the balanced budget may be tempered by the increasing contention
between Vice President Al Gore and House Minority leader Richard Gephardt who are
both vying for the next democratic presidential candidacy. See id.; infra notes 251-55
and accompanying text. The administration finally requested fast-track authority in late
September 1997. See infra notes 262-64 and accompanying text.
3 SIDNEY WEINTRAUB, NAFTA WHAT COMES NEXT? 80 (1994). The Mexican
Peso crisis also took its toll on the NAFTA effort. See Rediscovering the Americas,
ECONOMIST, May 17, 1997, at 15 [hereinafter Rediscovering]. Many critics also demand
more from NAFTA, which has been stigmatized by reports of job loss and very little job
creation. See Paul Magnusson & Amy Broun, Free Trade Was Supposed to be Easy,
Bus. WK., May 19, 1997, at 39. This is true despite reports that free trade has produced
growth and "1 of 8 net new jobs between 1992 and 1996." Id.
A summer of 1997 administration report lauded NAFTA for its successes, though its
picture was modest. See An Honest Report Card on NAFTA, CI. TRm., July 17, 1997,
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especially with ardent opposition from strange bedfellows such as
organized labor, environmental groups, consumer groups, Ross
Perot, Pat Buchanan, and a good number of Democrats led by
House Minority Leader Dick Gephardt. Up until the 1994
Republican victory in Congress, the Democratic leadership wanted
a bilateral agreement with Chile The Democratic leadership did
not believe that NAFTA's side agreements on labor and the
environment were strong enough and saw the bilateral agreement
as a means to strengthen protection of U.S. environmental and
trade standards.6
Congressional Republicans, however, have consistently sought
to avoid environment and labor issues in trade agreements,7
equating such riders with "bureaucratic meddling in the market
place."8 This political landscape, coupled with a lack of will in the
Clinton administration, has stalled any advancement of Chile's
case.
The following Article will first examine Chile's economic
fitness as a NAFTA candidate. The Chilean case is especially
informative because of the successes of Chile's free market
ideology as well as its status as an economic model and example
sec. 1 at 20. The Chicago Tribune, in an editorial, chided the President for not defending
the successes of the trade pact more agressively. See id. The article also claimed that
trade growth, investment and "accelerated" economic integration, as well as tremendous
future economic potential, were all NAFTA successes. See id. USTR Barshefsky has
noted that judging NAFTA on its first three years is short sighted, considering the pact
was designed to be phased in over a 15 year period. See Christopher Marquis, Small
Gains by NAFTA May Hurt Expansion Chances in the Future, FLA. TIMES-UNION, July
13, 1997, available in LEXIS, Market Library, Prompt File.
An independent study by DRIiMcGraw Hill was far more praiseworthy, relating
that NAFTA accounted for a positive impact of $29.4 billion on the U.S. Gross
Domestic Product. See id.; see also The NAFTA Effect, ECONOMIST, July 5, 1997, at 21
(assessing NAFTA and stating that political gains are far more significant than the
modest econonmic gains for NAFTA); Sidney Weintraub, In the Debate About NAFTA,
Just the Facts Please, WALL ST. J., June 20, 1997, at A19 (praising NAFTA gains,
political and economic, and dispelling common myths about the trade pact).
I See Morton Kondracke, NAFTA Redux: Both Sides Gear Up for 'Fast Track'
Fight, ROLL CALL, July 17, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Rollcl File.
5 See WEINTRAUB, supra note 3, at 96.
6 See id.
7 See id.
8 Lewis, supra note 2.
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to its Latin American neighbors.9 Next, the Article will discuss
Chile's evolving environmental regime and suggest that Chile
should not be denied NAFTA accession for environmental
reasons." The Chilean Constitution ensures the right to a clean
environment" and Chile has taken bold regulatory steps to fulfill
that constitutional guarantee. 2 The Chilean Supreme Court has
also championed the environment, recently stopping a large
forestry project. 3 Next, the Article discusses the U.S. political
battles over Chilean accession and suggests that U.S. politics,
rather than any deficiency on Chile's part, has held up Chilean
accession.14 Finally, this Article will propose an additional legal
solution to any environmental obstacles to Chilean NAFTA
accession which might remain."
II. Chile's Economic and Political Environment
A. Chile's Free Market Miracle
Consistent with the principles of NAFTA, Chile's economic
policy now rests firmly on the principle of free trade. The key to
Chile's recent rapid and consistent growth has been free market
reforms that have led the economy to be one of the most respected
in Latin America. 6 After years of following an import substitution
model, 7 Chile pioneered a free market model that emphasized
9 See infra notes 16-88 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 89-245 and accompanying text.
11 See CHILE CONST. ch. III, art. 19(E).
12 See discussion infra at notes 195-224.
13 See infra notes 162-68 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 246-82 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 283-84 and accompanying text.
16 See Deroy Murdock, Bustling Chile Could be Rounding a Corner Today, PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland), Dec. 11, 1993, at 7B.
'7 A country's decision to follow an import substitution model flows from a
distrust of exploitative foreign corporations and a desire to develop its own industries
using protectionist methods. See Don Podesta & Steve Coil, Chile Capitalizes on
Copper Mining, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 1994, at Al. Natural resources were protected by
the state, which recognized they were limited. See id. at A14. Import substitution was
also seen as a compromise between "unfettered capitalism and Soviet style Bolshevism."
Id.
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strong export orientation. Many of the lessons learned in Chile
were later applied in "Margaret Thatcher's Britain, the Czech
Republic, Israel, South Korea, Portugal and Spain, to name a few
,,18
Chile took as its model the export-based economic successes
of post-war Germany and Italy.19 Recognizing that export-led
growth can only be sustained during a period of economic
stability, while inflation and exchange rate movements are under
The Chilean application of this model culminated with socialist President Salvadore
Allende's nationalization of many industries, notably its copper mines. See id. While
the dictator, Pinochet, lowered tariffs and implemented many other free market reforms,
neither his government nor successive democratic regimes have privatized the
nationalized copper industry. See id. at A14-AI5. The nationalized copper industry,
Corporaci6n Nacional del Cobre de Chile (CODLECO), is the largest in the world. See
id. at A15. The Chilean government and CODELCO have worked out a compromise
with foreign investors. The government allows the investors to pay for extraction rights
and operate mines while the Chilean government continues to own CODLECO and
minority positions in the foreign operated mines. See id. at Al 5.
18 William Gruber & Pat Widder, A Returning Hero in Hyde Park; Milton
Freidman Still Doesn't Think Much of the Fed, But Says Alan Greenspan 'Has Got it
About Right,'CHL TRIB., May 15, 1997, at NI.
19 See id. The free market economic strategy was mostly associated with the neo-
liberal economic philosophy of Milton Friedman of the University of Chicago. This and
the fact that many of Pinochet's advisors were trained at the University of Chicago led
to the naming of Pinochet's economic advisors as the "Chicago Boys." See Gary Becker,
Latin American owes a lot to its 'Chicago Boys', Bus. WK., June 9, 1997, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Buswk File; Paul Craig Roberts, Welfare Doesn't Have to be
Habit-Forming-Just Look at Chile, Bus. WK., July 28, 1997, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Buswk File; Gruber & Widder, supra note 18, at N10; see also, Henry
Ma, Dear Editors Xeres Letter Draws a Dissenting View, Bus. WORLD, July 22, 1997,
available in LEXIS, Market Library, Prompt File (discussing the fact that there was at
least one woman in the Pinochet advisors and that Columbia and Harvard were also
represented). This commentator recommends Pinochet's Economists by Juan Gabriel
Valdrs as a good source for material on the Chicago Boys. See id.
One commentator relates the following, quoting Jos6 Pinera, ex-Pinochet economic
advisor:
I would have preferred to work under a democratic government ... but we
cannot choose our historic times .... I had to make the most difficult decision
of my life and abandon an academic career that I loved ... I sensed a call of
duty. I had a Ph.d in economics and had to go back to my country.
Peronet Despeignes, Economist Jos6 Pinera, INv. Bus. DAILY, Mar. 27, 1997, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Invdly File. Chile's success and influence on reforms in the
region bears out his decision. See Becker, supra.
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control," Chile has succeeded in controlling its exchange rate,
holding the currency to a level that ensures international
competitiveness."
Chile's inflation has similarly been kept in check by tight
fiscal management, so that Chile has not needed to rely on
privatization to balance its accounts. In addition, the Aylwin
government successfully predicted inflation rates. The Frei's
regime has preserved the vitality of the economy, sustaining "high
savings and investment, low inflation and a stable exchange
rate." 4
Economic and political stability provided by the Aylwin
administration facilitated the economic transition from Third
World country to Newly Industrialized Country (NIC). The
successive transition and democratic governments in Chile
maintained free market policies, increasing the level of investment
in health and education while working harder to create more jobs.
Ex-Finance Minister Alejandro Foxley and Frei economic advisor
Juan Villarzdi have both made statements indicating the democratic
regime's intentions to take development in Chile to the next
level.26
20 See Victoria Griffith, Taking Top Honors, LATINFINANCE, Oct. 1992, at 19.
21 See id.
22 See id. As one government official relates: "The difference between Chile and
other countries is that Chile started privatization with some surplus in its budget,' points
out Joaquin Vial Ruiz-Tagle, coordinator for economic policy at the Ministry of
Finance." Id.
23 See id.
24 More of the Same from Frei: Irela Makes Predictions for the Second Haif of His
Term, LATIN AM. WKLY. REP., July 29, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Txtnws File [hereinafter Frei].
25 See id. at 52. "These increases are as measured by the United Nations Economic
Commission for Latin America, from 40% to 33% of the 13.3 [million] population
between 1990 and 1992." Id. As reported by Business Week, a 1996 IMF report detailed
Chile's increased investment in public expenditures in health, education, housing and
some family allowances and pensions. See Gene Koretz, Chile Boosts Social Outlays,
Bus. WK., Nov. 18, 1996, at 34.
26 See Paul Mylrea, President Frei Says Democracy Permanent in Chile, Reuters,
Dec. 12, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Txtnws File. One commentator,
quoting ex-Finance Minister Alejandro Foxley, relates the following: "In Latin America,
you can't modernize the economy without at the same time taking a priority decision to
reduce inequalities, cut unemployment and make an effort to invest in people .... I am
[Vol. 23
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Chile's extremely vigorous economy has made it the most
prosperous country in Latin America.27 The World Economic
Forum in Switzerland dubbed Chile "the fifth-most competitive
newly industrialized power," following Singapore, Hong Kong,
Taiwan and Malaysia." Chile's sophisticated financial markets
have led investment consultants to describe Chile as the "old tiger"
of the Latin American capital markets." Others claim that Chile
represents "an Asian economy in the heart of Latin America."3
Chile's economy has grown at a rate of eight percent a year
since 1990, a rate which, if maintained, would give Chile the
living standards of Spain within ten years. With its strong
economic growth, Chile has invested in "electronic utilities,
railroads, supermarkets, pension funds, pharmaceutical firms,
textile plants and telephone systems . . ." in other Latin American
countries.32  Investment by Chile in neighboring economies
surprised by the results, because they went further and were better than I ever expected
.... Paul Mylrea, Chile, Its Economy Business Report, Reuter European, Dec. 2, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File. Juan Villarzu, Frei's economic adviser,
added: "We've set a target of eliminating extreme poverty in Chile by the year 2000,
.... We believe it's possible that by the middle of the first decade of the next century
for Chile... to be a developed country in terms of income per head." Id.
27 See Diego Ribadeneira, Warming Trend for US, Latins; Critics Say Only Rich
and Middle Class Benefit While Poor Are Out in the Cold, B. GLOBE, Dec. 27, 1993, at
20. Commentators are generally laudatory in their description of the new Chile:
It doesn't take long after landing at Santiago's international airport to discover
that Chile is unlike the rest of Latin America. Instead of the usual favelas and
slums, tidy pre-fabricated houses line the city's outermost streets. The center of
town is spotless and even the elevator operators are well dressed. "We often
think of ourselves as an island in Latin America," said one investment banker.
Inside the colonial government buildings and the glass and steel highrises,
Chileans break with Latin tradition by showing up on time for appointments
and exhibiting an unusual concern for coming up with accurate statistics and
numbers. Even the highest government officials show an almost puritanical
taste for modesty and self-effacement.
Griffith, supra note 20, at 19.
28 Murdock, supra note 16.
29 David Pilling, Keeping an Eye on the Old Tiger--The Emerging Investor, FIN.
TIMEs, Nov. 29, 1993, at 24, available in LEXIS, Busfin Library, Fintme File.
30 Id.
31 See James Brooke, With a View of One Hemisphere, Latin America is Freeing
It's Own Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1993, at D2.
32 Calvin Sims, Chilean Ostentation Piques Its Neighbors, INT'L HERALD & TRIB.,
1997]
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currently exceeds eight billion dollars.33
As a result of its success, Chile was recently admitted to the
Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation Trade Group (APEC). 34 In
addition, Chile became "the first Latin American country to be
awarded a formal investment-grade credit rating," when Standard
& Poor's gave the country's sovereign debt an implied BBB
rating, which designated Chile as a safe investment.35 In July 1995
the rating was upgraded to an A-."
Chile has effectively avoided the debt problems of its
neighbors. One commentator noted that the Latin America debt
crisis of the 1980s demolished many Latin "world class companies
... and, in its wake, left the image of backward institutions and
failed governments."37 However, this commentator distinguished
the Chilean experience, noting that Chile retained its "robust
economy... and sophisticated people and institutions" in spite of
the crisis."
Chile also led the way in the resurrection of the Latin
American corporate image after the debt crisis of the 1980s.
Compania de Tel~fonos de Chile was the first Latin American
company to list American Depository Receipts (ADRs) on the
New York Stock Exchange, raising 100 million dollars in an
oversubscribed offering.39
Nov. 18, 1996, at 1.
33 See id.
34 See Mexico: Is Accorded Membership in Asia-Pacific Trade Group,"
LATINFINANCE, Dec. 1993 at 6 [hereinafter Asia-Pacific]. At the APEC summit in
Seattle, Washington, on the same day that Mexico was formerly admitted, the group
announced the admittance of Chile in 1994. See id.; Phillippines, Austrailia Urged to
Go Slow in Pushing Democracy, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 12, 1997, available in
LEXIS, News Library, AFP File.
35 Long Overdue, LATINFINANCE, Oct. 1992, at 33, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Latfn File.
36 See Arturo C. Porzecanski, Chile, Is Chile Still a Model for Latin America?
LATIN AM. L. & Bus. REP., Aug. 31, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws
File.
37 Samuel R. Young, Jr., Recognizing Vital Signs, LATINFINANCE, May 1993, at
30.
38 Id.
39 See id. Mexico would follow in 1990, when Telffonos de Mexico, the Mexican
phone monopoly, "was sold to private investors for US $1.76 billion, making it the
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In light of the liberalization of its economy, access to NAFTA
would provide substantial economic benefits to Chile. Chilean
NAFTA negotiator Juan Gabriel Vald~s has given three main
reasons accession to NAFTA is important for his country.40 First,
NAFTA provides insurance against protectionism by the
developed world .4 Second, access to the North American market,
which has a Gross Domestic Product 200 times that of Chile, is
essential to Chile's export-based growth. 2 Third, Chile has found
that its value-added products are at a disadvantage, especially in
the agricultural sector, because the United States protects these
products at home.43
B. Comparisons to Mexican Accession
Economists rightly believe that Chile has a good chance of
negotiating NAFTA accession. 44 Mexico, for one, would not stand
in the way. Mexican businesses would welcome Chile into
NAFTA because the present Mexico-Chile Free Trade Agreement
(ETA) 45 contains no dispute settlement system.46 From Mexico's
point of view, Chile should meet existing NAFTA requirements
largest privatization ever for Latin America." Id.
40 See Timothy O'Leary, Chilean Official says NAFTA is Insurance Against




44 See Victoria Griffith, Positioning for Pacts: Latin Nations Vie for NAFTA-like
Agreements, LATINFINANCE, Dec. 1993, at 35, available in 1993 WL 12254438
[hereinafter Griffith, Positioning].
45 Chile already has a free trade agreement with Mexico and has recently
completed a free trade agreement with Canada which will take effect on June 2, 1997.
See John Urquhart, Chile Negotiates Pact with Canada on Route to NAFTA, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 15, 1996, at A18 (discussing Chile-Canada FTA); see also infra note 77-78 and
accompanying text (discussing Chile-Mexico FTA).
46 See COECE Official Raises Possibility that Side Accords Could be Dropped,
INSIDE NAFTA, Dec. 28, 1994, at 3 [hereinafter COECE]. Only the Mexican Business
Council on Foreign Trade (COECE), an influential private sector advisory group, has
indicated that the side agreements could be dropped from the requirements to accession,
while stressing that the organization has not taken a stance on the matter. See id. The
head of COECE, Juan Gallardo, indicated that the Summit for the Americas had made
clear that the accords had been construed to "foster enormous collaboration support and
technological exchange" that would not disappear if the accords were removed. Id.
1997]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
because any changes to those requirements would be to Mexico's
detriment.47 At a minimum, Mexico wishes for the Chile-Mexico
FTA to "form the core of the NAFTA extension.,
48
Furthermore, some analysts believe that Chilean NAFTA
accession should be easier than Mexican inclusion into the trade
agreement between the United States and Canada.49 Chile would
never suffer from anything like Mexico's peso crisis, which
necessitated a U.S. government bailout, because Chilean growth is
based on exports while the economic boom in Mexico was based
on loans."
The fear of jobs flowing out of the United States into Chile is
reduced as well, because of the relative distance between Chile
and the United States. In contrast to Mexico, the costs of exporting
goods from Chile to the United States is too high to justify
relocating any significant American industries to Chile.5
Chile also has a longer history of democracy than Mexico and
has achieved a smooth transition back to a democratic government
after a military reign of seventeen years." Prior to the overthrow of
47 See Pretty Slow; It Talks, Latin Am. Reg. Reps.: Mex. and Central America,
Aug. 24, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Txtnws File.
Id.
4I See Griffith, Positioning, supra note 44, at 35.
50 See Marco Antonio Sibaja, Crisis Stirs Concern Over Regional Economic
Model, Inter Press Service, Jan. 5, 1995, at 1, available in LEXIS, Market Library,
Prompt File. Foreign aid was non-existent because Chile was shunned for human rights
violations during its military regime. See Shirley Christian, The America's: Don't Let
Mexico's Woes Spoil Our Commitments to Chile, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 1995 at A13.
51 See Griffith, Positioning, supra note 44, at 35.
52 Pinochet allowed an October 1988 plebiscite, which he lost. See Brad Risinger,
A Chilling Look at Latin American Violence, RECORDER, Dec. 5, 1991, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Recror File. Chile officially ceased to be a dictatorship on March
11, 1990 with the election of President Patricio Aylwin. See Jean A. Briggs, A Political
Miracle, FORBES, May 11, 1992, at 108; Robert J. Quinn, Will the Rule of Law End?
Challenging Grants of Amnesty for the Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime:
Chile's New Model, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 905, 914-15 (1994). The second free elections
placed President Eduardo Frei, a Christian Democrat, into office. See id. at 55 n. 10.
During his first term, Frei made repeated attempts at constitutional reform which
may bear fruit during his second term in office. See Frei, supra note 24. "The once
prevailing fear of a possible return to authoritarian rule has now largely been
dissipated," which has emboldened the democratic coalition to more freely challenge
many policies left over from the dictatorship, such as the designated senators. Id. The
[Vol. 23
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Chilean democracy in 1973, Chile could boast of 150 years of
civilian democratic rule.53 Mexico's democracy, however, is still
flawed, as is evident from the Zapatista rebellion, claims of human
rights violations, and the PRI's one party hold over the country.
C. U.S. Failure in Chilean Accession is the Seed for
Protectionist Revival
Rejecting Chile's bid for accession after its successes would
send a very strong message of American insincerity to other Latin
American countries, which view Chile as a model. The United
States already has to tread lightly in Latin America because of its
trade policies concerning drugs, immigration and Cuba-policies
that have been the target of united Latin American criticism.55
Latin countries have decided that protectionism could enhance
their bargaining position with the United States.56 Regional trade
blocs are now accused of diverting trade and encouraging
protectionism. 7 Brazil has been an especially outspoken foil on
removal of the policy of appointing senators, a remnant of the past dictatorship, will be
proposed officially by Frei in March 1998. See id.
53 See DAVID HOiMAN, CHILE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT &
DEMOCRACY IN THE 1990s 6 (1993). Chile is often described as the "oldest and firmest
democracy in Latin America," because of its multiparty politics and full panoply of civil
and political rights. MARK FALCOFF, MODERN CHILE 1970-1989: A CRITICAL HISTORY 1
(1989). Prior to the 1973 coup, there was a brief dictatorship by Colonel Carlos Ibanez
del Campo, surviving only four years. See id. at 5. This episode, and the social and
economic problems caused by it, convinced many in the military to "never again...
surrender the prestige of their institutions to the intrigues of civilian politicians." Id. at
269. Aside from the Ibanez del Campo dictatorship, in which a democratic uprising
chased the dictator from the country, civilian government existed for 150 years until the
1973 coup. See HOJMAN, supra, at 8.
54 See Monica Serrano, The Army Marches Without a Map; Transition to
Democracy Alters the Military's Traditionally Insular Role and its Relationship to
Civilian Authority, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1997, at B5; Roberto Rodriguez, Mexico's
Election Merely Plants a Seed of Democracy, STAR TRIB., July 21, 1997, at 9A,
available in LEXIS, Market Library, Prompt File; Alfredo Corchado & Laurence Iliff,
Mexico in Transition; Growing Popular Movement Assails Political Structure, ORANGE
COuNTY REG. (California), May 26, 1997, at IA, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Ocreg File.
55 See Rediscovering, supra note 3, at 15.
56 See Sebastian Edwards, NAFTA Offers Latins Little They Can't Have Now,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 18, 1997, at A19 [hereinafter NAFTA Offers].
57 See id.
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trade issues"8 and the strengthening of the Mercosur-a Latin
American trade pact whose membership includes Brazil,
Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay59-- may come at the expense of
the U.S.-orchestrated NAFTA. According to other Mercosur
members, Brazil has made a "turn toward protectionism" because
of its limits on import financing within that trade group.6
Colombia's rise in import tariffs, protectionism in Venezuela and
Ecuador, and import controls in Mexico and Argentina all mark a
trend that portends a stall in liberalization.6' Perhaps these
problems would not have evolved in this manner had the United
States followed through on its homily of liberalization.
Within the United States, protectionism seems to pervade the
opposition to Chilean accession as well. Most of the U.S. sectors
opposing Chilean accession, such as the fruit growers, complain
about tariff and non-tariff barriers, such as sanitary and
phytosanitary measures,62 which can be negotiated during the
58 See Rediscovering, supra note 3 at 15; see also The Mirage that Won't Go
Away, ECONOMIST, May 10, 1997, at 42, available in LEXIS, News Library, Econ File
(discussing Mercosur's alternate approach to negotiation of a Free Trade Area of the
Americas by 2005).
59 See Proceed with Caution, LATINFNANCE, Oct. 1992, at 22 [hereinafter
Proceed].
60 See NAFTA Offers, supra note 36, at A19.
61 See id.
62 See Mexico, Chile Come Under Attack from U.S. Industry in NTE Comments,
INSIDE NAFTA, Nov. 16, 1994, at 5 [hereinafter Attack]. Chile had allowed only
American lemons and kiwis into the country and was on the verge of an agreement as to
apples and pears in early 1995. See Chile U.S. Have 'Major Differences on Fruit,' U.S.
Official Says, INSIDE NAFTA, Jan. 11, 1995, at 12. The entry of grapes was also being
considered. See id. U.S. fruit growers have indicated that they view the Chilean market
as small, but wish to position themselves for Argentina and to serve niche markets in
Chile. See id.
A fall 1994 GAO report indicated that U.S. problems with Chilean sanitary and
phytosanitary measures on fruits, poultry meat, and fish eggs were generally based on
legitimate concerns. See GAO Study Highlights Chilean SPS Measures that Curb U.S.
Exports, INSIDE NAFTA, Oct. 19, 1994, at 6 [hereinafter GAO Study].
There has been an administrative delay in establishing rules for apples, avocadoes,
blackberries, blueberries, raspberries, strawberries, other citrus fruits, pears, and stone
fruit. See id. There were no entry rules before 1991. See id. The Chilean government
was cited by the California Avocado Commission for its delay in reviewing entry of
California Avocadoes into Chile. See Attack, supra, at 5. Additional complaints were
discussed against Chile in regard to quotas for table grapes. See id.
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NAFTA discussions. Some analysts predict that U.S. fruit growers
and wine makers might challenge Chilean accession because Chile
exports about one half of its total $1 billion of fruit each year to
the United States.63 Opposition from fruit growers, including the
California Peach Advisory Board, may also be forthcoming
because of Chile's growing value-added agricultural industry that
imports products, such as canned peaches, that will compete with
U.S. value-added agricultural products.6 The competition between
Chilean and American fruits, however, may be lessened somewhat
61because of the nations' different growing seasons.
Even the protest by the indigenous Chilean Mapuche Indians
contains elements of protectionism.6 The Mapuche oppose
NAFTA accession because they claim it will result in the
destruction of bio-diversity, misuse of natural resources on their
lands, and because it will severely affect them as they are
producers of wheat and com.67  Private sector and government
sources say that when the tariffs drop to zero, wheat producers will
be significantly affected.6
The zero tolerance for salmonella was also cited by the report as "unduly restrictive
and a non-tariff trade barrier." GAO Study, supra, at 6. The tolerance was not based
upon scientific principles, because there are over 2,400 strains of salmonella carried by
animals and humans and only two severely affect chicken flocks. See id. This restriction
was seen as a response to the USDA not allowing Chilean poultry processing plants to
be a source for U.S. imports. See id. U.S. fish growers also charge that the Chilean live
salmonid egg import regulations are also discriminatory and exceed international
standards. See id. Another problem was the lack of transparency in Chilean government
for setting sanitary and phytosanitary regulations. See id. The distilled spirits council
says Chile's laws are "antiquated." See Attack, supra, at 5. Whiskey is taxed at 70% of
the duty paid, other spirits at 30%, and domestic pisco at 25%. See id.
63 See Griffith, Positioning, supra note 44, at 13.
6 See Fruit Industry Groups May Come Out Against Chile's entry into NAFTA,
INSIDE NAFTA, Dec. 28, 1994, at 4; see also Paul Levy, Chile is Red Hot, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 14, 1997, at A13 (discussing the increased interest in and growth of the Chilean
wine industry); Susan Postlewaite, Salmon Imports Take Leap but Florida's $150
Million Dollar Business is Jeopardized by Accusations that Chile is Improperly Driving
Down the Domestic Cost of Fish, BRowARD DAILY Bus. REv., Nov. 8, 1996, available
in LEXIS, Busfin Library, Filaw File.
65 See Griffith, Positioning, supra note 44, at 13.
6 See Indigenous Group in Chile to Visit U.S. to Oppose NAFTA Accession,
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D. Other Criticisms of Chile's Accession Unfounded
Other opponents and critics of Chilean accession fail to fully
take into account Chile's less intangible economic strengths. One
commentator argued that Chile is a weak NAFTA candidate for
three main reasons: First, Chile is not a major trading partner for
the United States, ranking thirty-third;69  Second, the absence of
border issues such as customs problems, migration, and cross-
border pollution make trade agreements less pressing;7" Third, the
United States does not gain a "platform" from which to enter other
Latin American markets because Chile is not part of another
regional trade pact.7' Additionally, this commentator believes that
the bilateral route would be counterproductive because layer upon
layer of separate bilateral agreements on top of NAFTA would be
inefficient and costly for the United States.72
This and other critics to Chile's accession bid have
misapprehended and underestimated Chile's true strengths. First,
Chile's strengths do not lie in its copper fields or vineyards, but in
its well developed government and financial institutions.73
Although Chile is not an economic powerhouse with the potential
of China's market or the natural resources of Brazil or Argentina,
Chile's positive accomplishments and leadership role in the
process of Latin American liberalization should be more important
to the United States than strict quantitative evaluations of the
Chilean GDP.
Furthermore, many Latin American countries admire and envy
Mexico's inclusion in NAFTA and are striving to accomplish the
same objective. 4 These countries also admire the Chilean model
of economic and political liberalization. Chile marched at the
forefront of the liberalization revolution by returning to a policy of
69 See WEINTRAUB, supra note 3, at 80.
70 See id.
71 See id. This commentator does agree, however, that Chile would be a good
model because of its political and economic achievements and that the conditions
established on Chile's inclusion will act as a precedent for other entrants. See id. at 95-
98.
72 See id.
73 See supra notes 16-43 and accompanying text.
74 See Griffith, Positioning, supra note 44, at 35.
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unilateral tariff reduction.75 Tariff rates should drop to seven
percent in 1997.76
Chile also led the trend toward the creation of Latin American
free trade pacts. One commentator relates: "Andean Pact, the
Group of Three, Mercosur and various Chilean agreements[] now
cover nearly all of South America.",77 Between 1990 and 1993,
Chile signed free-trade pacts with Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia,
Mexico, and Venezuela.
Delay in an agreement with the United States caused Chile to
begin looking far beyond Latin America for trade partners. In
recent years, Chile has signed agreements with Canada, 7 the
75 See Edwards, supra note 56, at A19.
76 See id.
77 Id. Chile began reconsidering Mercosur after the delay in NAFTA negotiations.
See Chile First but Columbia and Venezuela Closing; Group of Three on Verge of Deal,
LAT. AM. REG. REPS.: MEXICO & NAFTA REP., Dec. 2, 1993, at 2, available in LEXIS,
Nsamer Library, Lan File [hereinafter Chile First]. The Chileans, however, have
avoided the Andean Pact because Chilean free-market reforms are far more advanced
than those made by the pact's members (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and
Venezuela). See Peru, Government Edges Out of Andean Pact as Deficits Widen,
LAGNIAPPE LETTER, May 16, 1997, available in 1997 WL 9452948 (discussing Chile's
withdrawal in the 1970s and Peru's decision to leave to find better trade opportunities in
Mercosur and with Mexico); Andean Pact Continues Regional Integration Process,
LA-C Bus. BULL., Oct. 1, 1995, available in 1995 WL 8607958 (discussing Chile's
withdrawal in 1976 and the protectionist policies of the Andean Pact in the 1970s and
1980s). The Chileans also earlier declined an invitation to join the Mercosur pact. See
Next Step Chile, LATINFINANCE, June 1992, at 10; Liane L. Heggy, Free Trade Meets
U.S. Farm Policy: Life After Uruguay Round, 25 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1367, 1401,
n.97 (1994). The Mercosur Pact includes Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. See
Chile/U.S. Bilateral Free-Trade Pact? LATINFINANCE, June 1992, at 10. Chile hesitated
to join the Mercosur trade block until 1994. Chile joined as an associate member
because Chilean tariff levels were already lower than Mercosur levels. See Chile Says it
Wants to Become Associate Member of Mercosur, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
June 14, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Txtnws File. Chile has an 11% tariff
across the board for all countries, while Mercosur has higher rates which vary by
product. See id.; see also Ana Maria Anguinis, The Future of Free Trade in the
Americas: Can Mercosur Accede to NAFTA? A legal Perspective, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L.
597 (1995) (concluding that there are no legal obstacles to a Mercosur accession, though
other obstacles do exist).
78 See Brooke, supra note 31, at D2.
79 See Urquhart, supra note 45, at Al 8; Anthony DePalma, Canada Forges Trade
Pact with Chile, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 20, 1996, at 17.
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European Union, s° and APEC."
Although Chile is a relatively small trading partner for the
United States, its position as a leader in South American
80 See EU/Chile: Chile Hopes for Extensive Cooperation Accord with EU, EUR.
REP., Feb. 18, available in 1995 WL 8356806. This report states the following:
Chile hopes to begin negotiations shortly on an improved Cooperation
Agreement with the European Union. The fact that Chile is'currently
considering some form of membership of two different trade blocs in the
Americas is not an obstacle to closer ties with the EU, Chilean Deputy Foreign
Minister Mariano Fernandez said on February 17 ....
Chile's concept of regional integration differs somewhat from that of its
neighbors. Rather than joining one particular trade bloo-Mercosur, the Andean
Pact, the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA), the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation forum (APEC)-it has so far maintained a strategy of
seeking seek Free Trade Agreements with all its major partners, including the
EU.
The Government in Santiago is currently negotiating some form of
membership with both NAFTA and Mercosur (the Southern Cone Common
Market).
Id. Contrary to this report, Chile is a member of APEC. See Asia-Pacific, supra note 34,
at 6.
81 See Clinton to Meet ASEAN Lenders Over Currency Turmoil, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, Nov. 12,1997, available in 1997 WL 13432280. Accession to NAFTA has
become somewhat less of an "urgency" because of the trade ties that have been forged
across the globe. See Paul Blustein, Chile Makes a Soft Pitch for NAFTA Membership,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 28, 1997, at 17; Jonathan Friedland, Chile is Relaxed on
NAFTA as Chief Begins US. Visit, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 1997, at A18. Chile has even
argued that the failure of NAFTA would not be a "disaster." See Chile First, supra note
77, at 2. One commentator theorizes that the failure of NAFTA would cause the Latin
American countries to come together and move towards an eventual SAFTA (South
American Free Trade Area). See id. The Inter-American Bank echoed this sentiment at
the Summit of the Americas by stating that integration in the hemisphere would best be
achieved through many trade blocs that would eventually come together as a single
entity. See Hemispheric Free Trade Targeted, CARIBBEAN UPDATE, Jan. 1995, at 1,
available in LEXIS, Market Library, Iacnws File. The report relates:
The easiest path towards hemispheric free trade will be for countries to team up
in regional blocs, and for these to later merge into the FTAA, says Enrique
Iglesias, head of the Inter-American Development Bank. Some of this has
already occurred. In addition to NAFTA (which links the U.S., Canada and
Mexico, and will soon include Chile), there are] Mercosur (joining Argentina,
Bolivia and Paraguay); Andean Group (made up of Bolivia, Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela); the Central American Common Market;
Caricom (comprising 12 English-speaking Caribbean countries); and the Group
of Three (Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela).
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economics makes it a very important market for all NAFTA
members. In spite of its absence from NAFTA, foreign investment
by Canada, Mexico, and United States ($1.5 billion, $24 million,
and $4.54 billion respectively) accounted for over half of the total
1994 investment in Chile.
8 2
Second, the driving force behind trade liberalization should be
found in broader issues of development and the strengthening of
markets in the Americas, not the narrow resolution of border
problems. It is absurd that Chile should be penalized because it
does not have border problems with the United States.
Third, although many Latin American countries have trade
pacts with Mexico, they can not export goods into the United
States under the pacts because of NAFTA's country of origin
clause.83 This clause would equaliy bind the United States if it
wished to trade with a member of another free trade group. If the
United States wanted to gain the benefit of free trade with the
members of a trade group it would need to negotiate with the trade
group itself.
Accession into NAFTA would be the next logical step in the
Chilean economic plan. 4 In any event, Chile hopes to become "an
82 See Chile, Talks are Planned to Sketch Blueprint for NAFTA Entry, LAGNIAPPE
LETTER, Jan. 10, 1995, at 1, available in LEXIS, Market Library, !acnws File
[hereinafter Blueprint].
83 See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art.
401, 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]; Blueprint, supra note 82.
84 See Blueprint, supra note 82. Chile, as a country of only 14 million, needs an
open trade policy, especially with the government's emphasis on export, equalling one
third of total production, a far cry from only 12% two decades ago. See Griffith, supra
note 20, at 29. In accordance with Chilean export based economy, Chilean tariff rates
are the lowest in Latin America. See id. The Chilean economy centers on traditional
commodities, mining, and agriculture. Leading the economic expansion are
"[i]ndustries that develop and exploit the abundant natural resources of Chile-mining,
agriculture, fishing and forestry ..... Lawrence J. Jensen, Environmental Regulation in
Latin America: A Rapidly Changing Legal Framework, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall
1993, at 23; Griffith, supra note 20, at 19.
The country is longer than the U.S. is wide, but averages only 100 miles in width.
See id. Its land mass is approximately the size of Texas. See MERWIN L. BOHAN &
MORTON POMERERANZ, INVESTMENTS IN CHILE 7 (1960). It counts nitrate, copper,
lumber, coal, and a fertile agricultural base amongst its natural resources. See LIBERT
EHRMAN, OPPORTUNITIES FOR INVESTMENT IN CHILE 1 (1966). Nitrate was particularly
important to the international market at one time because, aside from its use as a
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export platform for the region,"85 not because it is part of a trade
grouping, but rather because its trade regime is extremely
advanced and attracts trade.86 Entering into another FTA or
NAFTA accession would give a clear policy direction for Chile's
private sector." After all, Chilean officials remark that they are not
seeking strategic alliances with the EU, NAFTA, Mercosur, and
APEC because they are in economic trouble, but because they are
in the best position politically and economically that they have
been in years.8
Il. Environmental Concerns
Chile should not be denied admission to NAFTA because of
environmental concerns. Chile has made great strides in
formulating a comprehensive framework to protect the
environment. The NAFTA side agreement contains demanding
environmental requirements. Chile understands that its
membership in NAFTA hinges on its ability to create a cogent,
enforceable environmental regime consistent with the side
agreement.
A. Chilean Preparation for the NAFTA Side Agreement
1. NAFTA and the Side Agreement
Concern for the environment figures prominently in NAFTA.
fertilizer, it was a key element in the production of explosives. See MARK FALCOFF,
MODERN CHILE 1970-1989, A CRITICAL HISTORY 3 (1989). Also, the Pacific Ocean's
Humboldt Current provides the country with fish and shellfish resourses. See EHRMAN,
supra, at 1, 8.
Some commentators note that a weakness of relying on mining and agriculture is
that the country is too dependent on copper, which accounts for over a third of the
country's foreign exchange income. See Griffith, supra note 20, at 19. The country has
plans to diversify, but for the moment is building upon its success in agriculture and
other commodities. See id. Chile is moving rapidly into value-added industries,
including very competitive food processing, wine, and furniture industries. See id.;
Griffith, supra note 20, at 19. Another Chilean weakness is that Chile also needs to
upgrade its transportation infrastructure, including roads and ports, an essential factor in
an export-based economy. See id.
85 Proceed, supra note 59, at 22.
86 See id.
87 See Insurance, supra note 40, at 8.
88 See id.
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The three member states of NAFTA, Canada, Mexico, and the
United States, agreed to the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation (side agreement) in September 1993.89
The side agreement became effective along with NAFTA on
January 1, 1994.90
The NAFTA preamble itself contains an express recognition of
environmental concerns.9 In the preamble, the parties agree to
engage in trade liberalization that will not ignore the possible
consequences to the environment.92 NAFTA declares that trade
relations will be in "a manner consistent with environmental
protection and conservation," and that "sustainable development"
is an important goal of the treaty.93
The preamble links trade and the environment in a structural
and strategic manner. Under NAFTA, trade issues are no longer to
be resolved in a vacuum, free from environmental considerations.
The parties agree to plan trade and investment with environmental
consequences in mind, including the coordination of
environmental regulations and a harmonization of environmental
laws.
Under NAFTA, a complaining nation has the burden of proof
for any challenge of an environmental or health measure.'
GATT/WTO procedures, in contrast, require that any party
defending a domestic sanitary or phytosanitary measure prove that
the measure is not arbitrary, is not a disguised barrier to trade, or
does not unjustifiably discriminate against foreign products. 95
The dispute settlement panel96 or a disputing party can also
89 See Implications of International Environmental Agreements Between the
United States and Mexico, BNA INT'L ENV'T DAiLY, Apr. 18, 1994, available in LEXIS,
Envirn Library, Bnaied File [hereinafter Implications].
90 See id.
91 See NAFTA, supra note 83, pmbl.
92 Id.
93 See id.
94 See id. art. 723(6).
95 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-
11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 188 [hereinafter GATT].
96 The dispute settlement process in NAFTA has three steps. First, formal
consultation, which allows each party the right to prompt consultation on any matter
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request a written report from "independent experts," usually non-
governmental groups or other scientific experts.97 This is the first
time a trade agreement allows trade experts to call upon this type
of input and experience. The settlement panel would then be
required to take the report into account when releasing its own
published report.9"
Finally, environmental issues that arise under chapters 7 or 9
of NAFTA, relating to mandatory trade provisions or specified
environmental or conservation agreements, can be forced into
NAFTA resolution.99  Normally, the member bringing the
challenge can go to the NAFTA forum or a GATT forum, but if
the matter is environmental, the defending member might be able
force it into the "greener" NAFTA process.
NAFTA also mandates that parties live up to independent
environmental agreements. °0  NAFTA enumerates "three
environmental agreements whose 'trade obligations take
precedence" over any inconsistent NAFTA provision.'
Moreover, the parties "can agree to add environmental
agreements" in addition to those listed."0 2
The side agreement deals specifically with enforcement and
the effectiveness of environmental protection that already exists in
the United States. The agreement "has established a Commission
for Environmental Cooperation whose responsibilities include
facilitating [the side agreement's] dispute-resolution process,"
affecting the members NAFTA rights. See NAFTA, supra note 83, art. 2006(1). If
consultation fails within 45 days, any member can call the three parties together for a
Free Trade Commission meeting, where they will choose appropriate dispute resolution.
See id. art. 2007 (1)(b)(4),(5). If this fails then an arbitral board may be called, which
will present a report to the Commission which must publish it within 15 days. See id. art.
2017(3). Then the parties make a final decision usually consistent with the board's
recommendation. See id. arts. 2008 (1), 2016 (2).
97 See id. arts. 2014, 2015.
98 See id. art. 2015.
99 See id. arts. 2003-2020.
100 See Implications, supra note 89.
101 Id. These are the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora (CITES), and the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements
of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal. See id.
102 Id.
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which includes trade sanctions, to deal with enforcement. 103 The
Commission on Environmental Cooperation was also created to
prepare an environmental protection record of the NAFTA
nations. '
The dispute resolution process has been criticized as unwieldy
and ineffective:
First, the dispute-resolution process is long and complex.
The process could take several months and as long as three
years if a country refuses to enforce its environmental laws and
the panel is forced to resort to sanctions.
Second, its enforcement provisions may be seldom used
since two of the three parties to the agreement must provide
their consent before the dispute process can even begin.
Third, it may be difficult to gather sufficient evidence of a
persistent pattern of failure by a party to effectively enforce its
environmental laws since the commission's investigative
powers under the side agreement are weak."°5
While these criticisms may have some validity, the overall effect
of the side agreement is far from weak. The side agreement
encourages stronger domestic environmental regulations in
compliance with the agreement.' The side agreement is not
primarily concerned with trade sanctions. It is rather "a
framework to promote cooperation and teamwork among
governments-cooperation on conservation and protection and
enhancement of the North American environment."'0 7
103 Armin Rosencranz et al., The Necessity Defense, RECORDER, July 8, 1994, at 13,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Recrdr File.
104 See North American Nations Ratify NAFTA, 12 ENV'T WATCH LATIN AM. 1060,
Dec. 1993, available in LEXIS, Market Library, Iacnws File [hereinafter Ratify].
1o5 Id.
106 See Rosencranz et al., supra note 103, at 13.
107 NAFTA: The World's First Green Treaty Environmentally Sound Trade, Bus.
MEX., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 51, available in LEXIS, Busfin Library, Abi File. The
agreement contains the following objectives:
1. Establishment of sovereign environmental-protection laws by each country,
combined with a high degree of protection and compliance contained within the
document;
2. Commitment to transparent procedures that are fair, equitable and open;
3. Creation of the trinational Commission for Environmental Cooperation...
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While not a central concern of the side agreement, trade
sanctions are still available. A member state that exhibits "'a
persistent pattern of failure to effectively enforce its environmental
law' may be subject to a monetary penalty and even a suspension
of NAFTA benefits if it continues neglecting its enforcement
obligations." '  Companies found violating the environmental
agreement and that fail to comply with the recommended
corrections after a stipulated time period can have monetary fines
of $20 million imposed.'
2. History of Chile's Treatment of its Environment
Until the recent past, Chilean policy was dominated by an
exploitationist viewpoint, which was characterized by a desire to
maximize productivity at the expense of the environment. "' Chile
[headquartered in Canada] to handle public inquiry, consider sanctions and
oversee conservation efforts .... ;
4. Formation of a council led by the three environmental ministers: [Secretary
Carol Browner of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Secretary
Carlos Rojas of Mexico's Secretariat of Social Development (SEDESOL), and
Canada's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Environment, the
Honorable Shella Copps.] They will deal with the public's "right to know,"
transboundary environmental damage, natural resource accounting methods and
policy guidelines. The Council is charged to meet at least once annually and to
have public sessions within these meetings;
5. Formation of a secretariat in support of the CEC to be its operational body
and to be led by an executive director with a trinational staff;
6. Formation, under this secretariat, of a Joint Public Advisory Commission
comprised of 5 non-governmental members from each country who will
oversee provisions for dispute resolution and enforce compliance; and,
7. Complaints lodged with the CEC will be reviewed by Joint Public Advisory





110 See Joseph G. Block & Andrew R. Herrup, Symposium: NAFTA at Age One:
The Environment Side Agreement: Addressing Environmental Concerns Regarding
Chilean Accession to NAFTA, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 221, 256-57 (1995); Karin Ranta,
Balancing Hardrock Mining and the Environment: The Chilean Model, 6 COLO. J. INT'L
ENVT'L L. & Pol'y 423, 429-30 (1995); Andrew Herrup, Chile's Place at the NAFTA
Table, LEGAL TIMEs, Dec. 9, 1986, at 23.
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did have environmental legislation as early as 1912,"' but it lacked
coordination, had overlapping authority, and had ambiguous
jurisdictions. At one time, Chile had hundreds of different
environmental statutory provisions and regulations, which in 1992
were condensed into one reference volume."2 Chile was never
plagued, as was Mexico, by lax enforcement. Chile's successive
governments have all had one consistent similarity: a devotion to
maintaining law and order,"3 but the environmental regime was
onerous and somewhat confusing.
Recently, Chile has made great strides towards a safer, cleaner
environment. Legislation has been drafted to mandate the use of
natural gas in industry and land vehicles." 4 As a result of these
measures, lead free gas arrived in Santiago as did more emissions
checks and inspections in 1992; all vehicles built after 1992 were
required to have catalytic converters. "' In June of 1994, twenty-
one ecological buses, the first of many, began their routes in
Santiago."6 One of the busiest ports in Chile, Talcahuano, has been
declared an emergency zone and a model clean-up plan has been
devised."7 Likewise, the metropolitan Santiago area has been
declared a contamination saturation zone by CONAMA, Chile's
"I Reportorio de La Legislaci6n de Relevancia Ambiental Vigente en Chile,
Comisi6n Nacional del Medio Ambiente, Secretaria T6cnica y Administrativa
[Important Environmental Legislation in Chile, Report of the National Commission for
the Environment, Technical and Administrative Secretary] (1992), at 195-97.
112 Id. The President then signed Supreme Decree No. 185, which regulates sulfur
dioxide pollution in mining, which was immediately enforced. See Ranta, supra note
110, at 43 1.
"3 See Showdown in Chile, J. COMM., June 22, 1995, available in 1995 WL
8997990; Leo Gross, On the Degradation of the Constitutional Environment of the
United Nations, 77 AM. J. INT'L. L. 569, 572 (1983); Edward C. Snyder, The Dirty
Legal War: Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Chile 1973-1995, 2 TULSA J. COMP. &
INT'L LAW, 253, 254-55 (1995). Even the military regime was said to have tanks that
stopped at traffic lights during a coup. See Stephen Budiansky et al., Democracy's
Detour, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 27, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Usnews File (retelling an old Chilean joke).
114 See id.
115 See Allen Boraiko, Bright Hopes for Chile? Economic Development, INT'L
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federal environmental protection agency, which reported that the
emissions norms it will use will be similar to those in effect in
California."'
A further testament to Chile's desire to establish and enforce
an environmental legal regime is that the Chilean government has
been shutting down older factories which tend to cause more
pollution."9 Chile has also restricted the use of cars to alleviate the
incredible amount of smog that affects Santiago."
Academics have also contributed to a greater environmental
awareness. The University of Chile has released a study that
highlights the costs of externalities to the Chilean population.'
The total comes to about $435 million a year in health costs and in
hours lost when factories have to shut down. 22 The University
report proposed a natural gas pipeline from Argentina to Chile
which would cut emissions pollution from sulphur oxide and other
contaminants by fifty percent and save Chile $100 million a
123year.
Chilean environmental groups continue to campaign on behalf
of the environment as well. The Chilean group RENACE began an
inventory of the nation's forestry in 1994.124 This accounting
estimates that Chile's native forests will disappear in twenty years
if current forestry practices continue. 5 The report as of October
1996 determined that ten million hectares were classified as native
forests and as many as eleven to twelve million hectares could
ultimately be so classified." 6 Pine and eucalyptus plantations have
118 See Chile, Metropolitan Santiago to be Declared Contamination Saturation
Zone by CONAMA, BNA INT'L ENV'T DAILY, June 11, 1996, available in LEXIS,
Envirn Library, Bnaied File.
119 See Chile-Environment: Air Pollution Shuts Santiago, Inter Press Service, July





124 See Boraiko, supra note 115.
125 See Environmentalists Achieve Legal Decision to Stop Forestry Megaproject,
Apr. 28, 1997 (visited on August 8, 1997) <http://www.chiper.cl/library/001.html>
[hereinafter Environmentalists].
126 See Wood Chip Exports from Native Forests (visited on Aug. 11, 1997)
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replaced the demand on the native forests. 7 A 1996 report by
Conaf, the National Forest Corporation, found that the use of
native trees for wood chips may be declining because of the
varying quality of chips coming from a number of different
trees. "' Eventually, native trees will instead be used in a
sustainable manner for value-added products, such as parts and
moldings for furniture, doors and windows.2 9
More important than these significant, yet somewhat
haphazard, efforts was Chile's attempt to impose some unifying
structure on its environmental regime. It passed an environmental
framework law in March 1994130 and Regulations for the
Development of Environmental Quality and Emission Norms and
Regulations for Pollution Prevention and Control Plans were
released in 1 995.131 The 1994 legislation significantly includes the
"polluter pays" principle.3 2 The law requires:
[1] environmental impact studies ... . for projects that cause
emissions, a potential risk to health, or require the relocation of
communities;
[2] and the creation of a new type of lawsuit, the
"environmental action," which allows citizens or government
authorities to bring lawsuits against individuals and





130 Ley Sobre Bases Generales del Medio Ambiente [General Environmental Law],
Ley No. 19.300, D&IAuo OFICIAL DE LA REPUBLICA DE CHILE, Mar. 9, 1994 available in
(last modified Nov. 11, 1997) <http://www.conama.cl/fhome.htm> [hereinafter General
Environmental Law].
131 See John Detzner & Pedro Alywin, In Chile, Environmental Law Awaits
Regulations, NAT'L L. J., Dec. 23, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Ntlawj File.
132 See Chile's Environmental Framework Law Awaits President's Signature, 4
ENV'T WATCH LATIN AM., Feb. 1994, available in LEXIS, Market Library, Iacnws File
[hereinafter Framework].
133 Id. The opening of the process to the general public is a revolutionary step for
Chilean law as is summarized below:
The proposed law would create a new cause of action for environmental
restoration that would be an addition to whatever rights a person has under
Chilean law to seek compensation for environmental damages. Restoration is
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The law does not require that there be a showing of an intent to
pollute, only that there be environmental damage in violation of
existing environmental regulations.'34
This framework marked the first time that NGO's were able to
legally challenge polluters, including the important parastatals still
owned by the government,'35 such as the copper smelters and
producers. Not surprisingly, Enami, the national copper smelting
company, and Codelco, the national copper producer, are currently
pursuing massive clean up and pollutant reduction plans.36 The
relationship between filing an EIS, receiving a permit, and liability
or a safe "harbor" from liability has not been fully developed. '37
Another important characteristic of the law is that it allows for
gradual adjustment by older industries, although new industries
must comply immediately. 3 This rule combines environmental
action with development and also lends credibility to the law for
the private sector, which might not be able to comply with an
unrealistic law.' Also, flexibility is demonstrated by the fact that
clean-ups will be negotiated on a case by case basis.'"
The Chilean law is different from other Latin American laws,
which are usually rigid codes that contain specific regulations.'
41
defined as the act of replenishing an environmental system or one of its
components to a quality similar to that which existed prior to the contamination
or, if that is not possible, to reestablish the basic properties of the system.
Citizens would be allowed to bring actions for environmental restoration,
apparently without the need to show that they have been directly affected by the
damage.
Jensen, supra note 84, at 57.
134 See Framework, supra note 132.
I" See id.
136 See Environmental Issues Now Loom Large for Investors, LAGNIAPPE LETER,
July 23, 1993, available in LEXIS, Market Library, Iacnws File [hereinafter Issues].
137 See Jensen, supra note 84, at 57.
138 See Framework, supra note 132.
139 See id.
140 See id.
141 See id. As related by one commentator quoting Rafael Asenjo, the head of
CONAMA:
We went for a framework law and not for a code as in Peru, Mexico, or
Colombia, because it is more realistic .... The Chilean law is a marvel of
brevity, with only 93 permanent articles. Countries that write up enormous
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Chile's traditional flexibility also manifests itself in the new
environmental regulatory regime. The Chilean framework does
have regulations, but CONAMA sets different limits, such as
emissions, and will revise them every five years to ensure
currency, compliance, and flexibility.
42
One commentator praised the 1994 legislation and Chile's
attempts to create an environmental legal regime:
[R]equiring a project to be assembled according to the host
country's environmental standards, has the benefit of
recognizing the host country's sovereignty and authority. In a
few developing countries, environmental standards are
sufficiently well-established to make this approach work. An
example of such a country is Chile ....
[T]he majority of developing nations have not followed the
path[] of Chile ... [and] are a long way from the example[] set
143by Chile ....
This flexible approach is a recognition of the special
circumstances involved in a developing economy, even one as
healthy as Chile's, which needs to adopt a measured and balanced
response to the issues surrounding development and the
environment.
Most importantly, the long awaited regulations governing the
environmental impact evaluation system were released in 1997
and are discussed at length below.144  The new environmental
framework law draft was influenced both by multinational
corporations who wanted clear rules to avoid future claims and by
public concern.
1 45
Critics of the government have claimed that the government
has sent confusing signals to its citizens, failed to actively enforce
codes setting ambitious goals and limits for all sorts of emissions suffer from
having their regulations ignored and going quickly out of date ....
Id.
142 See id.
143 Thomas Kerr, What's Good for General Motors is Not Always Good for
Developing Nations: Standardizing Environmental Assessment of Foreign Investment
Projects in Developing Countries, 29 INT'L LAW, 153, 159 (1995), available in LEXIS,
Itrade Library, Intlaw File.
144 See infra notes 196-224 and accompanying text.
145 See Issues, supra note 136.
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regulations, and that measures used by the twelve laboratories in
charge of measuring factory emissions are faulty.46 Furthermore,
businesses have been reluctant to use measures that are
preventative in nature, bowing only to restrictions when pollution
reaches dangerous levels. 147 These problems and criticisms can be
attributed to the relative novelty of the environmental legal regime
and to a lack of awareness in both the general public and in the
business community of adverse environmental consequences. The
continued viability of these and many other reforms has been
credited in part to the export sector, which feels pressure from the
global marketplace to be up to par with global environmental
148
norms.
3. Environmental Progress in Chile
To counter U.S. concern over Chile's ability to meet the
NAFTA side agreement's tough environmental standards, 141 Chile
is in the process of creating an advanced environmental regulatory
system. 5°  Simultaneous environmental reform and NAFTA
accession in Mexico were certainly no coincidence. ' Similarly,
Chile's renewed vigor in the environmental area can be attributed
primarily to possible NAFTA accession." As one Chilean official
stated: "Chile doesn't want to lose out on a free-trade agreement
with the United States due to a poor environmental record."'53
In an effort to modernize its environmental regime, Chile
entered into an environmental agreement with Canada in January
1995.54 The agreement focused primarily on policy harmonization
146 See id.
147 See id.
148 See Boraiko, supra note 115.
149 See Latin America and the Caribbean, BNA Daily Rep. For Executives, Jan. 31,
1994, at 19, available in LEXIS, News Library, Drexec File.
15o See id.
151 See US and Mexican Officials Say NAFTA Is World's Most Environmentally
Sensitive Trade Agreement; Critics Disagree, 2 ENV'T WATCH LATIN AM., Aug. 1992, at
1, available in LEXIS, Market Library, Iacnws File.
152 See id.
153 Id.
154 See Chile, Canada Sign Environmental Agreement, 5 ENV'T WATCH LATIN AM.,
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and information exchange.155 The Canadian agreement specifically
mentions "facilitat[ion]" of NAFTA accession for Chile as one of
its goals in its preamble.156
Chile and the United States signed an Environmental
Framework Agreement (EFA) in 1993 as part of the Enterprise for
the Americas Initiative (EAI).17 The EAI allows the United States
to use "debt for nature swaps," which is defined as "canceling or
restructuring of one nation's debt in exchange for that nation's
promise to support certain environmental programs or
activities.""15 The agreement is an "umbrella type pact" which will
Mar. 1995, available in LEXIS, Market Library, Iacnws File [hereinafter Chile, Canada
Sign]; Agreement on Environmental Cooperation Between the Government of Canada
and the Government of the Republic of Chile (visited July 8, 1997)
<http://www.ec.gc.ca/naapc-nace/english/new/ conchileag-e.htm> [hereinafter
Environmental Cooperation].
155 See Chile, Canada Sign, supra note 154, at 1. The article reads in part:
On 26 January, Chile's National Environment Commission (Conama) and
Environment Canada signed a memorandum of understanding on
environmental cooperation. The agreement seeks to promote bilateral
cooperation and establish a work program to harmonize environmental
legislation and policies and address common issues such as air pollution and
wastewater treatment.
Although the agreement does not specifically mention the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Chile is becoming more and more concerned
about what types of environmental requirements the NAFTA nations will make
if Chile is to join the trade agreement.
The agreement also calls on the two countries to establish a Joint
Environment Committee, consisting of an equal number of representatives from
each country, to oversee implementation of the work program. The committee
will work with a variety of public- and private-sector organizations to facilitate
information exchange and joint actions.
Id.
156 See Environmental Cooperation, supra note 154.
157 See Enterprise for the Americas Initiative Promotes Economic Growth, U.S.
Dept. of State Dispatch, June 29, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File
[hereinafter Enterprise for the Americas]. The EAI was set in motion by President Bush
to promote "free trade throughout the hemisphere, greater investment,. . . and increased
environmental cooperation .... Id.
158 Royal C. Gardener, Taking the Principle of Just Compensation Abroad: Private
Property Rights, National Sovereignty, and the Cost of Environmental Protection, 65 U.
CrN. L. REv., 539 (1997). Prior to the signing of the EFA, the United States had reduced
Chile's debt by 40%. See White House Background Briefing on the Visit of President
Patricio Alywin Azorca of Chile, Fed. News Service, May 12, 1992, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Arcnws File [hereinafter White House Briefing]. Chile, Bolivia, and
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carry out specific projects and could include training on
environmental impact assessment and hazardous waste and
pollution prevention. 159
Also, Japan has notably pledged up to 749 million yen for
environmental protection in Chile, mostly for technical training
and equipment for Chile's Environment Protection Center.6 °
Finally, the Multilateral Investment Fund, which is administered
by the Inter-American Development Bank, granted Chile $1.9
million in 1995 to promote and enforce environmental regulations
in Chile.'
4. Supreme Court Takes an Activist Role
Chile's Supreme Court joined in the environmental fray by
halting a large logging project in 1997.162 The seminal Trillium
decision encouraged Chilean environmental groups who were
doubtful that the Court would ever challenge the interests of an
important project or foreign investor. In Trillium, the Chilean
Supreme Court struck down government approval of a logging
project, stating that CONAMA, Chile's environmental protection
agency, had acted "illegally and arbitrarily" by allowing the $350
million dollar project to proceed in violation of the Constitutional
right of Chileans to live in a contamination free environment.
63
The Court also declared that the basic environmental law was
Jamaica reduced their debt and signed EFA's together under the EAI. See Enterprise for
the Americas, supra note 157. The EFA's established environmental funds that are
managed jointly by the United States and the host country. See id. The interest that
would have been paid by the debtor country forms a corpus that will be supplemented
by donations. See id. An estimated $ 1.4 million will be invested through this fund for
local projects in Chile. See White House Briefing, supra.
159 U.S. Chilean Environmental Agencies May Ink Bilateral Pact in Spring, INSIDE
NAFTA, Dec. 28, 1994, at 11 [hereinafter Ink].
160 See Japan to Give 749 mil. Yen in Grant Aid to Chile," Japan Wkly. Monitor,
Dec. 1, 1995, available in LEXIS, Market Library, Iacnws File.
161 See MIF Grants $1.9 million for the Promotion and Enforcement of
Environmental Regulations in Chile (visited on July 8, 1997) <http://
wwz.lab.org/PREWSA/CPI 11195 E.HTM>.
162 See Jonathan Friedland, Chile Court Rules Against U.S. Firm In Logging Case,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 1997, at A14; Jonathan Friedland, Green Chile, Across Latin
America, New Environmentalists Extend Their Reach, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 1997, at Al
[hereinafter Friedland, Green Chile].
163 Id.
[Vol. 23
CHILEAN ACCESSION TO NAFTA
simply too vague."
The Court's verdict stated the following:
A) The project approved by COREMA and CONAMA is illegal
because legislation covering Environmental Impact Statements
is not applicable due to lack of regulations.
B) The approval was not only arbitrary, and reached without
fundamentals, but contradicted all the technical
recommendations of the government's own specialists who
pointed out that "the information presented in the EIS was
insufficient to make a decision on the sustainability of the
project, as the continued existence of the forestry resource and
its fundamental characteristics are not affirmed."'65
The court's action may be a blessing for CONAMA, which
had been consistently "second guessed."'" Without clear
regulations, CONAMA's actions seemed too often motivated by
political forces rather than technical rules or norms.167 In response
to this decision the government quickly passed Environmental
Impact System (EIS) regulations.'68
5. The Tompkins Project
Support for environmental protection, however, is anything but
unanimous in Chile. Pro-environment and pro-growth groups
recently clashed over the role of an environmental reserve
proposed by U.S. businesman Douglas Tompkins, founder of the
Esprit clothing corporation. Tompkins purchased nearly 300,000
hectares in Southern Chile, which is two-thirds of the Palena
province, and smaller parcels in Chile Chico and Balmaceda 6 9 He
invested over a billion dollars in the project and is the single
largest landowner in the country. 7 '
'" See Chile's Environment, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 30, 1997, at 8.
165 Environmentalists, supra note 125.
166 Friedland, Green Chile, supra note 162, at A6.
167 See id.
168 See Chile's Environment, supra note 164, at 8.
169 See U.S. Magnate Defends Environmental Project, Mar. 24, 1995 (visited Aug.
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Tompkins wanted to establish a natural reserve to protect
native trees on the property, but his proposal came under attack by
a host of parties, including the military, the right wing, local
affected communities, and members of the center left coalition.'
The military and the right wing expressed concern over the
ownership of so much property along the Argentine border, as well
as other national security issues.' Because Tompkins' property
essentially cuts the thin nation in half,'73 those concerned speculate
that Tompkins' status as a U.S. citizen could provide a reason for
the U.S. military to intervene on his behalf.
7 4
Salmon interests also challenged Mr. Tompkins and his
foundation, the Deep Ecology Foundation, and many right wing
legislators, who are major owners of salmon companies, have been
accused of leading a campaign in order to thwart his plans for the
preserve.'75 ENDESA, a large Chilean power company, sent a
letter to the Office of the President opposing the park and accusing
Tompkins of funding a variety of environmental groups opposed
to Chilean growth.'76
The locals have accused Tompkins of forcing people off of
their land in order to buy it,'77 and the native Mapuche have asked
the government to declare the land a national preserve before
granting Tompkins any tax concessions."' The Mapuche have also
complained about the price paid for the property-less than ten
dollars per hectare in some instances-and the fact that any
reserve entrance or usage fees may be cost prohibitive to most
171 See id. President Frei, however, has endorsed the proposal. See id.
172 See id.
173 The park cuts a solid swath across the country from the Argentinean border at
the Andes Mountains to the Pacific Ocean. See id.
174 See id.
175 See Ecologists Defend Tompkins (visited Aug. 12, 1997)
<http://www.chip.cl/news/search/bol.. .995\5\12\ fn l.html&douglas tompkins>.
176 See Tomkins Park Could Clash with ENDESA Projects (visited Aug. 12, 1997)
<http:www.chip.cl/news/searchboL . .199717 3fn1.html&douglas,tomkins> [hereinafter
Clash].
177 See US. Magnate, supra note 169.
178 See Mapuces Oppose Plans for Park, Apr. 5, 1995, (visited Aug. 12, 1997)
<http://www.chip.cl/news/search/ bol... 1995\4\5\fn6.html&douglas tompkins>
[hereinafter Mapuces].
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Chileans, barring them from enjoying the preservation of their
own natural resources.179
Leftist nationalists have also opposed the park, seeing it as a
threat to Chilean sovereignty in accord with most of the opposition
from the right. 8° In contrast, socialist Enrique Correa, former
Secretary General of the Presidency, publicly opposed any limits
on ownership of private property because he feared that it would
discourage future foreign investment.81 This is quite a striking
statement from a prominent representative of the party of Allende,
the architect of Chile's past expropriation, nationalization, and
land redistribution.
: In July 1997, the government and Mr. Tompkins came to an
agreement over the area. 82 The solution gave the land to a private
foundation with Bishop Juan Luis Ysem and Tompkins sitting on
the board."3 The board will have four of seven members appointed
by Tompkins and the remaining will be appointed by Chilean
religious and academic institutions.'84 The agreement also required
the government to protect the land from development interests,
deem it a sanctuary, and exempt it from taxes. 8 The preserve was
designed to "showcase the diversity of Chile's ecology."'86
Tompkins also agreed to guarantee continued public access into
the area.117
At the heart of this very complicated dispute were many of the
same tensions present in Chile as a whole, especially those
between environmentalists and neo-liberalists. This debate and the
resulting political tension are refreshing in a region known for its
silence in the public forum. The dispute' demonstrates the
179 See id.
180 See Clash, supra note 176.
181 See id.
182 See Anthony Faiola, Chile, American Agree on Controversial Nature Preserve
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complexity of environmental and investment issues and highlights
Chilean ingenuity in achieving a resolution that both protected the
environment and placated the opposition.
6. 1997 Regulatory Reforms
Chile's crowning regulatory achievement in the environmental
area was the release of detailed Environmental Impact Evaluation
Systems regulations in April 1997, which further developed the
environmental legal regime."' Under the regulations, all
companies or entities taking any action which put the environment
at risk must complete comprehensive studies and reviews of their
proposed action for regulatory scrutiny. The essential framework
mirrors the highly effective EIS system in the United States.
The new regulations envision a highly-developed enforcement
scheme. Enforcement power would be spread between relevant
ministries or regulatory authorities and includes administrative
penalty authority.189 Relevant authorities could be those which
helped develop the standard at issue.'" Administration of
enforcement is the primary responsibility of CONAMA.19' As one
commentator explained:
The proposed law would vest primary authority over national
environmental issues in [CONAMA]. The commission would
not be a separate ministry, but would be governed by an
executive council comprised of several ministers. Its duties
would be administered through an executive secretariat and
various Regional Commissions on the Environment
(COREMAS).
It would clarify from a bureaucratic standpoint:
188 See Reglamento Del Sistema de Evaluaci6n de Impacto Ambiental [Regulations
on the Methods for Environmental Evaluation], art. 2(b), available in (last modified
Nov. 11, 1997) <http://www.conama.cl/fhome.htm> [hereinafter Regulations on
Environmental Evaluation].
189 See Jensen, supra note 84, at 57. Chile's existing laws that touch on
environmental matters would be left in place and the framework law would give overall
direction and unifying purpose to the implementation of those laws. The framework law
does not explain how any inconsistencies between it and the other laws would be
resolved. See id.
190 See id.
191 See id. at 25.
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[ 1] how and by whom environmental regulations and policy will
be developed and enforced;
[2] establish a comprehensive system for evaluating the
environmental impacts of public and private activities;
[3] authorize and give direction on the establishment of
environmental standards; and
[4] establish the guiding principles on liability for violating
environmental standards or causing environmental damage.'92
The framework law is just that, a framework, and as such does not
set any substantive environmental standards or provide "clear
guidance" as to the proper clean-up levels desired.'93 Standards are
the responsibility of the "affected ministries, and facilitation and
coordination of the process to CONAMA."' 94 The Chileans regard
this as necessary flexibility for their emerging industries; critics
may regard this as too vague and the lack of clear standards a
dangerous precedent. However, as has been indicated above,
Chile seems eager to adjust or adapt their laws to meet NAFTA
requirements and have taken steps to do so.
Looking at the new regulations in more detail, they essentially
track the General Law, providing a general inventory of how
varied projects may affect geographical conditions and resources
in Chile. The regulations, in accord with the General Law, allow
any state or quasi state entity which has functions related to the
environment to apply the regulations. 95
Article 3 of the regulations describes the projects or activities
that require application of the regulatory scheme.'96 It discusses
waterworks (such as dams, reservoirs, or diversions of rivers),
power projects (including nuclear reactors), commercial
development (mining, oil and natural gas, factories), and
agricultural projects in greater detail than Article 10 of the General
Law. 9
7
192 Id. at 57. See General Environmental Law, supra note 130.
193 See Jensen, supra note 84, at 25.
194 Id.
195 See Regulations on Environmental Evaluation, supra note 188, art. 2(b).
196 See id. art. 3(a)(1).
197 See id. art. 3.
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Article 4 sets out the circumstances that require an
Environmental Impact Study ("EIS") as opposed to the less
intensive Environmental Impact Declaration ("EID").98 Voluntary
submissions and all projects of the type described in Article 3
require an EIS.'0
Article 5 requires an EIS if the project or activity generates a
risk to the public health."0 The risk is determined by measuring
the quality and quantity of the vapors, emissions or waste
produced by the project.2"' Norms are to be set by the appropriate
state entities; but, in the event that norms are not set at the time,
the standards set by the Swiss Confederation will be substituted.2 2
An EIS is also required under Article 6 if the project presents a
significant detriment to the quality or quantity of renewable
natural resources of the earth, water and air.
20 3
Article 8 discusses how to analyze potential effects on the
public in an area where an EIS is required and Article 8(a)(c)
describes the factors to be used in such an analysis, including
demographics, religious or folkloric traditions, and access to
natural resources for particular groups guaranteed certain
protections under the law.20 4
The regulations consider not only the interests of indigenous
groups protected by law, but also preservation of the culture of
other groups and existing profitable associations. The reference to
existing profitable associations in 8(c) could include, for example,
a group of local independent fishermen.0 5  This regulation
acknowledges that tourism, whether eco-tourism or otherwise,
requires preserving certain aspects of Chilean society. However,
the regulations do not mandate such a requirement, which is
compatible with the policy flexibility required by sustainable
198 See id. art. 4.
199 See id.
200 See id. arts. 5, 7.
201 See id.
202 See id.
203 See id. art. 6.
204 See id. art. 8.
205 See id. art. 8(c).
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development.2"' It gives the Chilean government broad options in
balancing environmental and developmental concerns.
Article 9 requires an EIS if the project is situated near the
public, public resources or protected areas that are sensitive and
susceptible to alteration. 7 Article 10 requires an EIS if a project
will jeopardize landscapes or other areas that have tourism value.0
Article 11 requires an EIS if the project affects the cultural wealth
of Chile, including monuments, archeological sites, sites with
anthropological importance, etc.' 9  Enacted law defines
monuments, 10 and the regulations allow the government to take
into account the following factors to determine if the cultural
wealth of Chile is being affected: structural characteristics of the
site, antiquity, scientific value, historical context, importance to
the Chilean cultural wealth, or whether or not the site carries with
it a particular significance to an identifiable community or group
which carries on certain traditions on that site.1
Title III of the regulations, Articles 12-16, describe the exact
requirements of an EIS. An index and summary, not to exceed
thirty pages, is required . The summary must do the following:
1) describe the project, 2) describe a plan of compliance with the
applicable legislation and regulations, 3) identify which portion of
Article 11 of the General Law requires the EIS, 4) include an
identification, prediction and evaluation of the eventual risk from
the project, 5) include a plan for the mitigation, reparation and
compensation associated with the project, if necessary, 6) specify
the methods of controlling risk and accident prevention, if
necessary, and 7) include a plan which addresses the original
conditions which required the EIS. 13
These provisions also require that the EIS be a self-contained
206 See supra notes 138-43 and accompanying text.
207 See Regulations on Environmental Evaluation, supra note 188, art. 9.
208 See id. art. 10.
209 See id. art. I1 (a)-(c).
210 See id. art. 11 (a).
211 See id. art. Il(a)-(d).
212 See id. art. 12(a)-(b).
213 See id. art. 12(c)-(k).
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document, be drafted in a manner understandable to laymen, and
still be in compliance with the specifics outlined in sections (c)
through (k) of Article 12.214 Article 13 simply requires the
information to be supported and that the necessary addenda and
EIS be in the official language of the Republic of Chile."5
Articles 14-16 briefly outline the requirements for the EID,
which applies to projects that correspond to the requirements of
Article 11216 or that voluntarily submit to the system.217 Articles
17-49 discuss the procedure for an evaluation for the submission
of an EIS and EID, as well as the substantive requirements for
government reports and responses, including a required Technical
Assessment Report.2
Article 49, which requires that the file and all attending
documents be open to the public, is especially significant,
although an interested party may petition the government to keep
certain intellectual property confidential. 219 Articles 50-55 provide
for public participation in the system and Articles 56-57 discuss
the process of confidential classification of materials, noting that
any information relating to the circumstances that necessitated the
EIS as specified in Article 11 of the General Law, will not be
deemed confidential 2
The provisions on community participation require the
government to establish the proper mechanisms for public
participation.22 The project owner or manager must publish a
summary of the EIS in the Didrio Oficial or in a paper of national
circulation or in a paper in circulation in the capital of the region
in question.222 An interested organization, such as an NGO, or an
214 See id. Article 12 (c)-(k) outlines the specifics needed to comply with Article
12(b). See id.
215 See id. art. 13.
216 See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
217 See Regulations on Environmental Evaluation, supra note 188, arts. 14-16.
218 See id. arts. 17-49.
219 See id. art. 49.
220 See id. arts. 50-57.
221 See id. art. 50.
222 See id. art. 51.
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individual can submit her own evaluation of the project.223 The
government also publishes a list of projects that have filed an
EID.
224
The National Wildlife Federation, the Sierra Club, National
Audubon Society, Community Nutrition Institute and the Center
for International Environmental Law testified before the Senate
Finance Committee on June 3, 1997 that a system of
Environmental Impact Assessments, very similar to the one
developed by Chile, should be employed in the fast track bill in
order to "support[] the use of trade rules to promote sustainable
development. ' ,225  The use of a federally required EIS "should
ensure [that]: (i) the EIS will be prepared early enough in the
negotiation process to guarantee timely public disclosure; (ii)
adequate opportunity is provided for public comment; and (iii)
negotiations take account of the analysis produced., 26 Central to
the goal of the EIS, both in the NWF proposal and the Chilean
regulations, are transparency, access to information, and public
comment.
7. Solid Enforcement of International Obligations
Chile is also taking international environmental obligations
seriously. In August 1994, Chile refused to allow a Croatian
freighter, the Triglav, to dock as planned in the port of San
Antonio. 227 Authorities discovered that it was carrying toxic waste
in violation of the Basilea Convention, and they refused the
Triglav entry."' Chile has also lodged complaints against Japan,
Britain, and France for their involvement in the transport of
fourteen tons of radioactive material by a British freighter through
223 See id. art. 53.
224 See id. art. 55.
225 Prepared Testimony of Mark Van Putten, President, National Wildlife
Federation Before the Senate Finance Committee Subject Extension of 'Fast Track'
Negotiating Authority, Federal News Service, June 3, 1997, at 33, available in LEXIS,
Genfed Library, Fednew File.
226 Id. at 36.
227 See Chile Environment: Ship Carrying Toxic Waste Due Next Week, Inter Press
Service, Aug. 11, 1994, available in LEXIS, Market Library, Iacnws File.
228 See id.
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the Drake passage, one of the most dangerous navigational
passages in the world and within Chile's economic zone."'
8. Environmental Leadership in Mercosur
Chile has also moved towards linking trade and the
environment in its free trade proposals to other Latin American
countries. In a proposal to Mercosur, Chile indicated it desires
more than the simple elimination of tariffs and non-tariff
barriers-it wants a regional free trade area that includes services
and protection of intellectual property and the environment.230
This goes even beyond Brazil's proposal for a South American
Free Trade Area (SAFTA)."' In the past, Mercosur has not been
very active in the environmental area,132 but Chile's associate
membership may continue to bring environmental issues to the
table.
In short, the environmental demands of NAFTA should not bar
Chilean accession. Many U.S. and Chilean environmental groups
do remain skeptical of Chile's environmental sincerity. But
whatever wrinkles remain in Chile's environmental regime are due
primarily to "growing pains, rather than duplicity. Chief
Chilean NAFTA coordinator, Juan Gabriel Valdes, stated that
Chilean environmental legislation "conforms perfectly with the
text of NAFTA agreements on labor and environmental matters
.. 234 Especially in light of recent regulatory reform, Chile
stands environmentally ready to enter NAFTA.
229 See Chile to Protest Against British Nuclear Freighter, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-
AGENTUR, Mar. 20, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Dpa File. The freighter
had also angered Argentina which has a similar ban on transporting such materials
through its waters. See id.
230 See Chilean Proposal to Mercosur Seeks Wider Coverage than SAFTA," INSIDE
NAFTA, June 29, 1994, at 1.
231 See id.
232 See Mercosur Agreement Takes Effect, Environment Not a Priority, ENV'T
WATCH LATIN AM., Feb. 1995, available in LEXIS, Market Library, Iacnws File.
233 See id.
234 Chile Won't Negotiate its Entry into NAFTA Twice, Official Says, INSIDE
NAFTA, Mar. 8, 1995, at 19 [hereinafter Negotiate].
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9. The Mexican Model
Mexican accession to NAFTA was troubled by a number of
environmental issues, none of which should present a problem to
Chilean accession. The United States was understandably
concerned about the neighboring Mexican environment, but it has
less self-serving reasons for concern about Chile's environment.
Although Mexico had a well-developed regulatory regime
prior to NAFTA,235 it was largely ineffective because of a lack of
enforcement.236 Risks for companies in violation of Mexico's legal
environmental regime, however, increased dramatically during the
NAFTA negotiations."' Mexico increased its environmental
enforcement dramatically, "inspect[ing] 5,045 plants throughout
Mexico, resulting in 980 partial or temporary closings and three
permanent closings." 238  Government expenditures for
environmental control programs were budgeted at six million
235 See Kenneth N. Frankel, Mexico Gets Tough Mexico: Environmental
Regulations Strengthened in Preparation for NAFTA, LATINFINANCE, Mar. 1992, at 39.
The Mexican laws are summarized as follows:
Mexico's regulatory regime is similar to the U.S. regulatory framework.
The backbone of Mexico's environmental laws is the General Law of
Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental Protection ("the General Law"),
which was enacted in 1988.
The General Law contains specific chapters concerning air, water, soil,
hazardous waste, noise, vibration, thermal energy, lighting, odor and visual
pollution. It also sets out enforcement procedures and other provisions
concerning the respective responsibilities of the federal and state governments.
Mexico's laws are prospective and do not contain provisions as sweeping as
the Superfund provisions contained in U.S. law to handle past waste disposal
problems, although such measures are being discussed currently in Mexico.
The Secretariat of Urban Development and Ecology ("SEDUE") is the
federal body which oversees the enforcement of the General Law. Although
several of Mexico's 32 states have also promulgated environmental laws,
SEDUE is the only governmental entity actively engaged at present in
enforcement.
Id.
236 See Demythologizing the Trade Pact, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1993, at D16; James
Gerstenzang, Judge Deals Blow to Free Trade Pact, L.A. TIMES, July 1, 1993, at Al.
237 See id.
238 Id. "From only January 1, 1991, to May 15, 1991, there were 275 plants
inspections in Mexico City alone which resulted in temporary or partial closing of more
than 102 facilities and two permanent closings." Id.
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dollars in 1988, to increase to over several billion dollars in the
next decade.239
Mexican companies could no longer rely on relaxed
enforcement and simply ignore or claim ignorance of the
environmental regulations. 24° Non-compliance can result in civil
and criminal penalties, "clean up" bonds, temporarily or
permanently stopping operations, and negative publicity associated
with being a corporate polluter.24  For example, the Mexican
government closed a large oil refinery in Mexico City as part of a
citywide compliance campaign intended to reduce pollution from
metal forging, chemical, cement and paper production plants.2 2
The closing was noteworthy because it resulted in the loss of
approximately 6,000 jobs.243
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency also established an
office in Mexico City to help the Mexican government "in
enforcing Mexico's environmental laws and coordinating
transborder enforcement of [both the U.S. and Mexican]
environmental laws.",244 The Mexican agreement established the
North American Development Bank (NADBank) to finance border
environmental projects, "such as sewage treatment facilities and
community renewal programs.
245
Because Chile does not share a border with the United States,
Chilean membership in NAFTA would not necessarily entail such







244 Id. The office has also been involved in developing border pollution control
polices, especially in light of lawsuits filed against eight U.S. corporations for illegally
exporting waste into Mexico. See id.
245 Ratify, supra note 104. Over a four year period, "the United States and Mexico
will each contribute $225 million that will be leveraged into $2-$3 billion." Id. A Border
Environmental Cooperation Commission will "review projects submitted for financing
from NADBank and [coordinate] private capital to help industry comply with
environmental regulations." Id.
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B. The U.S. Political Landscape and Other Accession
Concerns
If Chile is so well poised to become a NAFTA member, then
what are the real obstacles to Chilean accession? As stated above,
the debate over Chilean accession into NAFTA really isn't about
Chile entering NAFTA. The debate involves the precedential
value of the process which will be used to accept another country
into the agreement. The process adopted to bring Chile in will
probably become the manner to let in all future entrants. Chile
itself does not present a problem. Chile is amenable to the
environmental side agreements and seems to want the laws in
place for their own good.
The congressional debate involves a Republican attempt to use
Chilean accession to undo the link between trade and environment
in NAFTA, specifically the trade sanctions used to enforce
environmental compliance. The Republican House has indicated in
the past it will fight linking the environmental side agreements to
fast track authority.2 Some Republicans, however, have indicated
that a compromise that tackled soft enforcement, or other such
unfair trade practices, could be suitable to them.247
The Republicans also argue against the use of trade sanctions
to enforce the environmental provisions of the side agreement.
One implication of this argument is that Republicans are worried
that environmentalism will disguise unilateral trade aggression,
which could eventually erode and destroy the multilateral trade
regime. A more likely possibility is that the Republicans do not
want trade sanctions to be used against U.S. corporations. In any
event, Republicans have indicated, again, as noted above, that a
compromise might be reached.248
Chile's case may not fare much better with the Democrats. In
August 1997, Congressman Richard Gephardt made a "fact-
finding trip" to Chile, Argentina, and Brazil.249 The Wall Street
246 See John Maggs, Chile's Move to Mercosur May Pave its Way Into Nafta, J.
COMM., July 8, 1996, available in LEXIS, Market Library, Prompt File.
247 See Lewis, supra note 2, at 5.
248 See id.
249 Leslie Crawford, Gephardt Heads for Santiago Trade Talks, FIN. TIMES, Aug.
13, 1997, available in LEXIS, Market Library, Prompt File.
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Journal characterized Mr. Gephardt's visit to Latin America in the
summer of 1997 with the following:
The tour was billed as an opportunity to look at "economy,
trade, defense and foreign policy issues." But given Mr.
Gephardt's union constituency back home, the more likely
purpose was strategizing for the upcoming congressional fast-
track debate and, of course, preparing for a run at the presidency
in 2000.250
There was an obvious and understandable lack of interest in
Gephardt's visit in Santiago, where he was received politely, but
without much fanfare."' This reception was understandable in light
of Gephardt's record on NAFTA. He originally stopped
momentum and stalled NAFTA approval,252 which had been one of
the most bipartisan movements in its time."' Gephardt has been a
staunch opponent of any trade agreement that does not have
stronger protections for labor and the environment,254 despite the
fact that Chilean labor and environmental interests are split over
these issues."'
The influence of American presidential politics on the Chilean
economy has left Latin America's free trade proponents more than
a little disgusted. They too have to fight protectionist holdouts at
250 Mary Anastasia O'Grady, Latins are Victims of Democrats' Trade Politics,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 1997, at A15.
251 See id.
252 See Jagdish Bagwati, Is This Showdown Necessary, NEWSDAY, June 11, 1995,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Bustdl File; Joyce Barnett, Gephardt to Insist on
Labor Regs for Expanded NAFTA, Daily News Record, Mar. 31, 1995, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Asapii File.
253 See President Clinton's First Year Accomplishments, U.S. News Wire, Jan. 24,
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Usnwr File; Nancy Dunne, Clinton Pressed to
seek NAFTA Changes, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1992, available in LEXIS, Market Library,
Prompt File (noting the development of NAFTA by Republican Presidents Reagan and
Bush, mostly with bipartisan support).
254 See Lewis, supra note 2; Jim Landers, U.S. Seeking Role as Free Trade Grows
in Latin America, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 4, 1997, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Dalnws File.
255 Chile's largest trade union does not oppose NAFTA, but wants inclusion of the
side agreements. See Chile NAFTA Deal Must Include Labor Rule-Union, Reuters
Final Service, Feb. 28, 1997, available in LEXIS, Busfin Library, Reufin File. Chilean
ecologists feel NAFTA will lower current Chilean environmental protections. See id.
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home, and that's much tougher when the United States, "rather
than stand by its promises, plays political games. 256
U.S.-organized labor has become bolder in light of the
continued attacks on NAFTA and free trade by Gephardt.
Democrat Calvin Dooley, who will vote for fast track despite labor
opposition, stated: "If this were a secret ballot. . . fast track would
pass by an overwhelming margin. But labor is playing hardball on
this one, and they are being very direct with members." 257
U.S. labor is also mounting a major radio and television ad
campaign as well as mobilizing workers to put added pressure on
the White House and Capitol Hill."' Reporters have speculated
that the success of the U.P.S. settlement has reinvigorated labor's
efforts in this area.259 U.S. business is also responding because the
delay could mean that business loses its bargaining position and
might not be able to expand into badly needed new markets. As
one U.S. CEO, Robert J. Eaton of Chrysler, relates: "Without fast-
track, we won't make any significant gains .... We'd be allowing
the rest of the world to set the trading rules., 26" Tariffs, for
example, make quite a competitive difference, even at Chile's low
eleven percent rate, when Canadian and Mexican companies pay
261
zero percent.
President Clinton finally asked for fast track authority in late
September 1997, and the request comports with the Congressional
Republican desire to avoid linking the environment and labor to
any trade deals.262 Specifically, the White House asked for fast-
256 Id.
257 Glenn Burkins, Labor Fights Against Fast-Track Measure, WALL ST. J,, Sept.
16, 1997, at A24.
258 See id.
259 See Amy Borrus et al., Business is in Hurry for Fast-Track, Bus. WK., Sept. 15,
1997.
260 Id.; see also Robert Mosbacher, U.S. Exporters to Latin America Need Fast-
Track, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 1997, at A23 (discussing the effects of the delay in fast
track authority on U.S. exporters with specific examples of the trouble U.S. companies
have experienced).
261 See id. at 40.
262 See Bob Davis & Greg Hitt, Clinton Asks for Trade-Pact Authority, Avoiding
Labor, Environmental Issues, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, at A2. President Clinton conceded
defeat on fast-track in early November. See Art Pine & Janet Hook, Clinton Pulls Trade
1997]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
track because even if environmental protection measures in trade
pacts "somehow passed the [R]epublican-controlled Congress,
[they] would be rejected by negotiating partners abroad., 263 The
White House did add language, however, to its proposal to the
effect that U.S. negotiators would work to strengthen workers'
rights through the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the
International Labor Organization (ILO). Its proposal would also
allow negotiators to pursue positions whereby other nations could
not lower their labor and environmental standards and gain a
competitive advantage over the United States.6  The
administration's proposal does not prevent the White House from
pursuing separate side agreements.
Practically speaking, the only real obstacles to Chilean
accession seem to be internal U.S. political problems. The
Canadian and U.S. governments have indicated that accession
should include the side agreements and that they want Chile to
agree to the accords. 265 The Chilean American Chamber of
Commerce has stressed its desire to prevent environmental and
labor issues from becoming major issues during the trade talks,
especially the linking of environmental and labor issues with fast
track authority.
Ambassador Mickey Kantor, however, wished to keep the side
agreements "as is," finding it very difficult to imagine how
NAFTA could hold different requirements for different
266SoeDcountries. Some Democrats indicated that the United States
Trade Representative (USTR) might not need fast track for Chile
anyway and that negotiations can be carried out under normal
legislative rules.267 Chilean negotiators agree with the USTR that
Bill Rather Than Risk Defeat, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1997, at Al. For further discussion
of fast-track's failure, see infra notes 276-82 and accompanying text.
263 Id.
264 See id. at A 10.
265 See COECE, supra note 46, at 3.
266 See Archer Sees no Deals with Administration, Democrats on Fast Track, INSIDE
NAFTA, Feb. 22, 1995, at 3.
267 See id. Kantor said that negotiations could begin with out fast track authority,
but any country would be hesitant to conclude trade negotiations without it. See id.
Democrats disagree, believing that negotiations can be concluded without fast track. See
id.
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proceeding with the texts "as is" is far easier than coming up with
other agreements. 6 The present administration, including USTR
Barshsefsky, has avoided discussing the preference for NAFTA
accession or a bilateral agreement because of the intense U.S.
political considerations that exist with either option.
Chile does not want to become embroiled in the debate
between Republicans and Democrats over fast track. It simply
does not want to negotiate the same agreement twice.269 Chile may
want to incorporate its FTA with Mexico in the same way the U.S.
CFTA was incorporated into NAFTA."7 ° The North American
Commission for Environmental Cooperation (NACEC) endorsed
the idea that future entrants into NAFTA be required to adhere to
the side agreements because this would avoid creating "double
standards" in the region."'
Many of the earlier considerations in favor of redrafting an
agreement are already moot because the principles behind the
agreement are continually being redrafted with each agreement
that Chile signs or negotiates. The Canada-Chile FTA and the
Mercosur associate membership, as well as the future Chile-
European Union-FTA all set precedents of their own and shape the
free trade potential of the Americas without the input of the United
States.
The United States' tardiness on fast track and Chilean
accession has led some, including Thomas Andrew O'Keefe, the
President of Mercosur Consulting, to suggest that Chilean
accession is now a "dead issue." 72 According to Mr. O'Keefe,
Chile's associate membership in Mercosur ended the expansion of
NAFTA into South America by accession. Because Bolivia and
the Andean nations will likely follow Chile's lead and join
268 See Negotiate, supra note 234, at 19.
269 See id.
270 See id.
271 See Kevin G. Hall, NAFTA's Environmental Czar Wants to Include Chile - Side
Accords, J. COMM., Dec. 6, 1996, available in LEXIS, Market Library, Prompt File.
272 See Prepared Statement of Thomas Andrew O'Keefe, President, Mercosur
Consulting Group, LTD. before the House International Relations Committee
International Economic Policy and Trade Subcommittee, Fast Track, NAFTA, Mercosur
and Beyond: Does the Road Lead to a Future Free Trade Area of the Americas?.
Federal News Service, July 9, 1997, available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Fednew File.
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Mercosur, the United States will be negotiating with a South
American trade bloc with interests quite different from NAFTA.273
Mr. O'Keefe cites to Article 52 of the Mercosur agreement which
requires any favorable tariff concession granted by Chile to be
granted to Mercosur or otherwise Chile must negotiate "equivalent
compensation. 27 4 Mercosur has already requested that Chile grant
concessions comparable to those it gave Canada under the Chile-
Canada FTAY5 "
In November 1997 the Clinton administration suffered a
serious setback in the postponement of a vote on fast track in the
House due to the inability of the President, who seems to be a
lame duck early in his second term,276 to bring in enough votes
from his own party. 77 The defeat was characterized as "rais[ing]
questions about the long term viability of the so-called 'U.S.
model' of open markets, deregulation and privatization. '2 7' A
leading Japanese paper editorialized that "Clinton's fast-track
debacle signals the end of the era when progress in the
liberalization of the world trade depended on U.S. initiatives," and
called for Europe and Japan to fill the leadership vacuum.279 The




276 See "No Sale," Failure of Fast-Track Trade Bill Does U.S. Economy a
Disservice, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Nov. 20, 1997, at Al8, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File [hereinafter No Sale]. But see Brian Knowlton, As APEC Opens,
the Mood is of Resistance, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 22-23, 1997, at 11, 15 (contending
that the effect of the fast-track loss in Congress on the 1997 APEC meeting was
countered by the strong U.S. economy, which acts as moral leverage against countries
suffering the effects of mismanaged economies seeking multilateral support). The
Financial Times called the defeat the worst in the past three years. See Clinton Fast-
Track Defeat, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws
File.
277 See Ann Scales, Clinton-House Democrats Rift Widens; Failure of "Fast Track"
Trade Initiative Seen as Symbol of Relations Gone Sour, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 16, 1997,
at All, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File; With U.S. Off Trade Fast
Track, Japan, Europe Need to Step Up Pace, NIKKEI WKLY., Nov. 17, 1997, at 16,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File [hereinafter Step Up].
278 Jim Lobe, Economy: Fast-Track Defeat a Blow to U.S. Model, Inter Press
Service, Nov. 12, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
279 Step Up, supra note 277, at 16.
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Democrats with trade and non-trade issues,28° as well as further
jockeying for the democratic presidential candidacy in the next
election.28 ' The BBC reported that the Chilean government was
"indifferent" to the result, and President Frei stated that "[t]his is
strictly a U.S. problem[;] it is not a Chilean problem. Chile
continues its traditional policies on international trade."2 2
IV. Conclusion and Proposal
Chile has been a model among Latin American countries, both
economically and due to its bloodless transition from military
regime to a democracy. It has brought down trade barriers and
influenced the economic policies of its neighbors to adopt similar
policies.2 3 It also did not hesitate to take the lead in developing an
environmental regime which could balance economic growth and
conservationism. Denying Chile accession into NAFTA over
highly politicized U.S. internal disagreements will destroy the
efforts of three U.S. administrations to promote hemispheric
growth and stability through free trade.
Chile has taken great pains to comply with the environmental
principles outlined in the NAFTA side agreement. If any current
inconsistencies exist, these still should not keep Chile out of
NAFTA. The enforcement mechanism in the side agreement is
arguably necessary only because of Mexico's previous history of
relaxed enforcement and because of its border with the United
States. Theoretically, Chile would be free of the necessity of
having environmental protection linked with trade sanctions
because it has no such proximity to the United States.
Past deficiencies in Chilean environmental enforcement appear
to stem from many problems which the new environmental law is
280 See Scales, supra note 277, at Al1. Blame was also placed squarely on the
President's shoulders in another editorial: "If Mr. Clinton is looking for someone to
blame, he should look in a mirror. His year long procrastination and wimpy last gasp
effort to convince congressional opponents, mostly in his own Democratic party,
doomed the trade bill which he said should have been a 'no-brainer."' No Sale, supra
note 276, at A1S.
281 See Step Up, supra note 277, at 16.
282 Government Indifferent to Clinton "Fast Track" Failure, BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, Nov. 18, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
283 See supra notes 16-43 and accompanying text.
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supposed to remedy, most notably the consolidation of legal
administration and coordination into CONAMA. The Chilean
efforts to create a legal environmental regime, along with the
country's reputation for respect for the rule of law, may be enough
to ensure that no competitive imbalance results between Chile and
the other NAFTA countries because of enforcement problems.
Chile could become an even better NAFTA candidate by
reforming its system of remedies in environmental cases.
Adopting remedies such as injunctive relief, which is not available
in many civil code countries, would modernize and empower the
Chilean courts. The recent Trillium decision in Chile's Supreme
Court indicates that the judiciary is increasingly willing to enforce
the law even if it goes against the wishes of powerful investors!"
This decision also demonstrates the growing influence of
environmental groups in Chile, which could act as watch dogs
over the excesses of the market, alerting the proper enforcing
authorities to problems.
As long as publicity and public participation are increased in
potential NAFTA member countries, then NAFTA trade sanctions
could be dropped. This means moving towards greater
transparency in domestic legal regimes and in trade discussions,
both of which are notoriously secretive. The existing NAFTA
member countries would not be placed at an economic
disadvantage because Chilean companies were not complying with
strict environmental measures. If Chile, or any other member
country, were guilty of consistent environmental violations, the
other countries could simply terminate that country's membership
in NAFTA based upon the competitive disadvantages resulting
from industry non-compliance with established environmental
norms.
As this Article has demonstrated, Chileans acknowledge
the effects of industrialization and the precarious position of
Chile's export-based economy dependent upon its natural
resources vis a vis these effects. Chileans have demonstrated
responsiveness and sensitivity to environmental concerns in their
country and it is quite patronizing for the United States to impose
284 See supra notes 163-68 and accompanying text.
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standards on a nation which has enjoyed so many political and
economic successes. Chile is no environmental pariah nor a nation
troubled by a history of lax enforcement of its laws. It is far better
to have this country join in a de jure partnership with the United
States on trade policy than have the United States demean the
achievements of the de facto partnership that already exists,
especially with the growing influence of a protectionist Brazil in
Latin America. The sanction of expulsion, if used in conjunction
with increased disclosure and public participation, would allow
Chilean accession into NAFTA without enduring controversy over
environmental issues and would further the multilateral efforts to
liberalize the global economy with a continued push for
liberalization in the Americas.

